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Marxism, Early Soviet Oriental Studies and the 
Problem of ÔPower/KnowledgeÕ 
 
Few would be surprised to learn that the Russian Revolution of 1917 resulted in a 
radical reconfiguration of relations between intellectuals and the state and between 
networks of individuals themselves. However, despite the important work of a 
number of recent specialists including Alpatov (1997), Tamazishvili (2008), Hirsch 
(2005) and Buttino (2014), the nature of this reconfiguration often remains poorly 
understood among non-specialists and some specialists alike. The enduring influence 
of Michel FoucaultÕs notions of discourse and of power/knowledge plays an important 
role here. By collapsing the distinction between power and knowledge it becomes 
impossible adequately to consider their interrelationships and their crucial historical 
transformations. In place of careful analyses of the numerous reconfigurations that 
followed 1917, the adoption of a Foucauldian framework tends to lead scholars to 
speak about a ÔSoviet discourseÕ of this or that area or problem as if a unitary and 
unshifting paradigm reigned from 1917 to 1991. While there is clearly continuity in 
the vocabulary utilized by those in political power and in much academic writing of 
that period, one should not be misled by lexis. As Edward Said noted, there is Ôa 
sensible differenceÉ between Logos and words: we must not let Foucault get away 
with confusing them with each other, nor with letting us forget that history does not 
get made without work, intention, resistance, effort, or conflict, and that none of these 
things is silently absorbable into micronetworks of powerÕ (1983, p. 245).  
 
Nowhere is the Foucauldian approach more debilitating than in studies of the 
production of knowledge about societies that were adversely affected by colonialism 
and imperialism, for here key transformations of constellations between intellectuals 
and institutional power are often buried beneath longue dure conceptions about 
discursive formations. The notion of a single ÔEnlightenment discourseÕ is particularly 
problematic given the highly contested dialogues between the radical, atheistic 
currents within the Enlightenment, beginning with SpinozaÕs philosophy, and those 
moderate philosophes determined to reconcile the advance of science with religious 
prejudices and the established social order on which Jonathan Israel has written in 
detail. The rise of colonialism acted on this field in complex ways (Israel, 2006, pp. 
590Ð614), but these are often glossed over in accounts of intellectual history framed 
by poststructuralism.  
 
How much more problematic then when the same approach is applied to oriental 
studies in the early USSR. Michael Kemper, author of a number of valuable works on 
central Asian Islam and certain aspects of Soviet Oriental Studies, for instance, 
characterizes Marxism as Ôan extreme form of European Enlightenment thinkingÕ 
(Kemper 2006, p. 6) and proceeds to present a putative ÔSoviet discourse on the origin 
and class character of IslamÕ by assimilating a wide variety of exploratory works on 
the socioeconomic foundations of early Islam into a unitary discourse with little trace 
of surplus or marks of resistance. Such works were allegedly instances of a ÔMarxist 
discourseÕ that Ôwas itself pure ÒOrientalismÓ (in the sense of Edward Said),Õ, he 
argues, holding the Ôessentialist view that it was possible to grasp the ÒcharacterÓ of 
early Islam, and that this knowledge would provide them with an understanding of 
contemporary Muslim peoples.Õ Such thinkers Ôunquestionably put their knowledge at 
the disposal of the state, which used it for ruling and thoroughly transforming these 
contemporary Muslim societiesÕ (Kemper 2009, p. 46). There are a number of reasons 
to object to this attempt to grasp the essential ÔcharacterÕ of early Soviet oriental 
studies. Firstly, to analyse the socioeconomic conditions under which Islam arose, or 
to seek to identify the specific social groups among which it originated, is not in itself 
Ôessentialist.Õ Secondly, such an approach does not necessarily suggest that the social 
bases of the religion remained unchanged and that social analysis of its origins 
provided some sort of template for understanding contemporary Islam in the USSR. 
Rather, it suggests merely that in order to understand a complex, cultural phenomenon 
one needs to approach the matter historically, commencing with an analysis of the 
conditions in which it arose. Thirdly, while it is undeniable that the Stalin regime did 
indeed employ the work of orientalists to rule and transform Muslim societies, it does 
not follow that from the very outset of the Revolution there existed a unitary 
Ôdiscourse of Soviet orientalismÕ that functioned Ôto turn the Orient into an instrument 
of Soviet RussiaÕ (Kemper 2010, p. 449). There is a fundamental difference between 
attempting to win leadership in a revolutionary struggle against a common adversary 
and treating an ally simply as an instrument. The many debates about the strategy of 
hegemony before and after the Revolution focused specifically on this distinction (see 
Brandist 2015). While there are plenty of reasons to be critical of many contributions 
to early Soviet oriental studies, simply to read a putative ÔdiscourseÕ back into the 
debates of the 1920s is questionable indeed. It is, however, legitimate to argue that in 
the 1930s there was indeed a concerted effort to homogenise Soviet perspectives on 
the East and to use the knowledge generated as a resource for the imperial domination 
of the Soviet ÔEastÕ and the subordination of the independence movements across the 
colonial world to the foreign policy of Moscow.  
 
One might here recall SaidÕs discomfort with FoucaultÕs assumption that Ôthe 
individual text or author counts for very littleÕ, and the formerÕs insistence that 
Ôindividual writersÕ do leave a Ôdetermining imprintÕ on an Ôotherwise anonymous 
body of texts constituting a discursive formation like OrientalismÕ (Said 2003 [1978]: 
23). Rather than assimilating every utterance to a closed discursive circle, it is of 
crucial importance to focus on the Ôdynamic exchange between individual authors and 
the large political concerns shaped by theÉ great empiresÕ (Said 2003 [1978], pp. 14-
15), of the period in question, if the formation of something like a ÔSoviet 
OrientalismÕ is to be identified and understood. Most crucially, one must overcome 
what Said called FoucaultÕs Ôflawed attitude to power [which] derives from his 
insufficiently developed attention to the problem of historical changeÕ (Said 1983, 
p. 222). The current article aims to develop a perspective on the emergence of Soviet 
oriental studies that takes account of some of the complexities of exchanges between 
networks of individuals in the context of historical transformations, and to shine some 
light on forgotten aspects of the history of postcolonial theory itself. 
 
Russian Marxism and the ÔEastÕ 
 
Just as there was no single Enlightenment discourse about the orient, as Bryan S. 
Turner noted in a book published the same year as SaidÕs Orientalism, Ôthere is no 
such thing as a homogenous tradition of Marxist analysisÕ about the Orient, or indeed 
about many other matters (Turner 1978, p. 8). In his later works Marx made 
considerable advances in freeing himself from the unilinear narrative of historical 
development he had inherited from the contemporary positivist historians he was 
reading (see, inter alia, Habib 2006; Anderson 2010 and Achcar 2013). While 
deriving considerable empirical data from such studies, his works are marked by an 
increasingly critical perspective on the modes of conceptualization and generalization 
such scholars employed, and his late works made it clear he did not regard the pattern 
of development of European societies to apply directly to non-European societies. 
TrotskyÕs historical writings on the particularities of Russian historical development, 
in which he developed the principle of combined and uneven development, marked a 
further step in this direction (see Banaji 2010; Anievas and Nisancioglu 2015). Here 
the establishment of the so-called Ôlaws of motionÕ of specific historical formations 
take precedence over locating societies on a pre-established scheme of stadial 
development, what in StalinÕs time came to be referred to as the ÔpiatichlenkaÕ 
(primitive society, slave-holding society, feudalism, capitalism and socialism). Contra 
Kemper (2009, p. 35), this Ôconcept of five universal socio-economic stagesÕ was not 
Ôthe classical Marxist conceptionÕ but was, from the outset, a positivist reduction of 
Marxism developed by Second International determinists, including the founder of the 
first Marxist political group in Russia Georgii Plekhanov. This was subsequently 
canonized by Stalinist historians. Between them was a period of considerable debate 
and discussion around central Marxist conceptions and a rethinking of the patterns of 
historical development of developing societies, which had been necessitated by the 
Russian Revolution itself. If we consider these questions historically then the 
achievements of this short period appear all the more impressive. 
 
The development of a new, Marxist approach to studying the East was severely 
hampered by a severe shortage of Marxists who knew oriental languages or who had 
focused their research on the colonial world. The centre of revolutionary activity, 
including the struggle for national self-determination, had been in Europe, even 
though Lenin in particular had recognized the significance of the 1905 defeat of the 
Russian state by the ascendant Asian state of the time, Japan. ÔAdvancing, progressive 
AsiaÕ, Lenin proclaimed, Ôhas dealt backward and reactionary Europe an irreparable 
blowÕ (Lenin 1962 [1905], pp.  48-49). Although Lenin increasingly considered the 
national and colonial questions, many regional Party organisations before the 
Revolution relegated the national question to a secondary position in search of a 
unified Marxist organization across the Empire (Blanc 2016). This undoubtedly 
contributed to a lack of connection between rising demands for legal equality and 
cultural autonomy among such ÔEasternÕ peoples as Buriat-Mongols and Kazakhs 
after 1905 and the workersÕ movement based in the cities (Sablin and Korobeynikov 
2016). While LeninÕs The Right of Nations to Self-Determination (1964a [1916]) and 
the Lenin-Bukharin analysis of imperialism (Lenin 1964b [1916]; Bukharin 1929 
[1915, 1917]) were important milestones in Marxist thinking about the colonial world, 
it was failure to establish new Soviet governments in some regions during the 1918-
21 Civil War (Poland, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Finland and others), followed by 
successes in some areas, often assisted by Red Army intervention, soon after, that 
placed the need to address the aspirations of the non-Russian populations at the 
forefront of the political agenda of the entire movement. In a number of cases the 
central authorities had to intervene to rectify Russian-chauvinist policies developed 
by local Soviets that were dominated by Russian colonists (Safarov 1921, pp. 104-
123; Buttino 2014). Non-Russians who joined the Party in this period were generally 
not experienced Marxists, but brought a range of populist, nationalist and other ideas 
with them. The formation of Communist Parties outside what was to become the 
USSR similarly led to the recruitment of anti-imperialists with a range of 
backgrounds and perspectives and whose understanding of Marxism was rudimentary 
at best. Thus early attempts, particularly at the Congress of the Peoples of the East in 
Baku in September 1920, to establish a framework for a united front against 
imperialism, in which Marxist internationalism would make an attempt to win a 
leading role, resulted in some awkward formulations, with ZinovievÕs call for a ÔHoly 
WarÕ against imperialism only the most notorious (Riddell 1993, pp. 85-89). It would 
take concerted efforts focused on the first four congresses of the Communist 
International (1919-22) to work out a strategy for negotiating the various trends 
within the movement against imperial domination in the colonial world.  
 
These intense and fraught, but important debates, which involved such important 
figures as the Bengali revolutionaries M.N. Roy (1887-1954) and Virendranath 
Chattopadhyaya (1880-1937), and the Persian Marxist Avetis Sultan-Zade (1889-
1938), were foundational in the establishment of an international movement against 
imperialism. No sooner had this begun to find theoretical articulation, however, that 
the final defeat of the German Revolution in October 1923 launched counter-
revolutionary processes that would result in the twin disasters of Stalinism and 
Nazism and would lead to fundamental revisions. Until the end of the 1920s policy 
and Oriental Studies alike remained subject to competing pressures. It is therefore 
hardly surprising that Marxist historical and theoretical studies of the East did not 
appear fully articulated, but had to emerge through interaction with a range of pre-
existing perspectives about the Orient in rapidly changing political conditions. Such 
interactions in some cases enriched Marxist approaches but in other cases required 
Marxists extricate themselves from the hold of colonial prejudices.  
 
The Heritage of pre-Revolutionary Orientology 
 Russian ethnography was shaped by the work of dissident, anti-imperialist populists, 
associated with the Narodnaia Volia (PeopleÕs Will) group, who studied the 
languages and cultures of the peoples of Siberia while exiled by Tsarist authorities. 
Among them were the Polish activists and ethnographers Wacław Sieroszewski 
(1858-1945) and Bronisław Piłsudski (1866-1918) and the Jewish activist-
ethnographers Vladimir Jochelson (1855-1937), Vladimir Tan-Bogoraz (1865-1936) 
and Lev Shternberg (1861-1927). The exiles formed informal networks for research 
and were able to publish some work with the support of the Imperial Geographical 
Society. While the first three emigrated after the Revolution, Bogoraz and Shternberg 
played important roles in the formation of early Soviet ethnography and oriental 
studies in Leningrad. These fellow-traveller intellectuals generally retained the 
positivist, evolutionary perspective that was dominant at the time, while advocating 
the rights of indigenous peoples.  
 
Simultaneously there was a number of pre-Revolutionary orientologists working 
within the Imperial Academy of Sciences who had been critical both of Tsarist 
nationality policy and the dominant types of European oriental studies and who were 
willing to cooperate with the Bolshevik regime after the Revolution. These specialists 
were also immersed in positivism and psychologism and they had sought to reform 
rather than end the Russian imperial state. They opposed the Eurocentrism of British 
and French oriental studies, which posited the West as dynamic and rational, and the 
East as stagnant and religious, worked tirelessly to overcome prejudices about the 
Moslem East, and celebrated the cultural achievements of oriental societies. Yet in 
doing this liberal Russian orientologists, like the great historian of Central Asia 
Vasilii Bartolʹd, the Indologist Sergei Olʹdenburg and the Georgian archaeologist and 
philologist Nikolai Marr, sought to defuse separatist sentiment and to promote a 
hybrid, pan-Russian identity based on common civic values (Tolz 2006). As 
Gerasimov, Glebov and Mogilner (2016) show, this idea of hybridity became quite 
widespread in the late imperial period as a way of understanding the imperial 
situation. The imposition of cultural institutions on subject peoples could now be 
subject to critique, while separatist ideologies based on the assertion of an integral 
unity could be undermined.  
 
Liberal advocacy of multi-culturalism became an alternative to full national self-
determination, while progress was to be measured by the Ôpeaceful convergenceÕ of 
the peoples of the East with Russia. While they viewed the direction of social 
evolution as universal, and the relative positions of different societies in the hierarchy 
of states as historically contingent rather than reflecting essential capacities, they held 
that the incorporation of societies with a ÔlowerÕ level of culture into a political space 
dominated by a society with a ÔhigherÕ level of culture to be advantageous for all 
concerned. Bartolʹd argued that the Tsarist state should support Oriental Studies 
because Ôthe peoples of the east will believe in the superiority of our culture all the 
more when they are convinced we know them better than they know themselvesÕ 
(1963a [1900], p. 610). Persuasion did not, however, preclude the necessity of using 
force to achieve imperial goals, for Ôthe measures taken by specific [Russian imperial] 
governments to close down and open up markets, including the aggressive 
campaignsÕ in Turkestan, were Ômerely unconscious steps on the road to the 
establishment of the ever more apparent historical mission of Russia Ð to be the 
intermediary in the overland trade and cultural intercourse between Europe and AsiaÕ 
(Bartolʹd 1963b [1927], p. 432).  
 
These thinkers formed the nucleus of the ÔoldÕ post-revolutionary Russian 
orientology, centred on Petrograd/Leningrad, producing much valuable work on the 
philology, religion and philosophy of the Orient that sought to break the hold of 
Eurocentric perspectives. Levels and modes of engagement with Marxism among 
such scholars varied considerably, but they were encouraged to teach, research and 
publish throughout the 1920s and they played important roles in the policy of 
decolonization that came to be known as korenizatsiia (ÔindigenizationÕ or 
ÔnativizationÕ), through which local languages, cultures and cadre were promoted. 
Although the emerging ÔnewÕ, Marxist oriental studies aimed to bring cultural factors 
within its orbit, this long-established and well-developed base in Leningrad led these 
scholars to exert a greater influence than might be expected. 
 
The ÔNewÕ Oriental Studies 
 
Attempts to forge a new network of Marxist orientologists formally began with the 
formation of the All-Russian Scientific Association of Oriental Studies 
(Vserossiiskaia nauchnaia assotsiatsiia vostokovedeniia, VNAV) within the 
Commissariat of Nationalities (Narkomnats) in December 1921. Leading figures 
included the Bolshevik Mikhail Pavlovich-Velʹtman, a member of the collegium of 
Narkomnats, and the non-Party Vladimir Gurko-Kriazhin, who drafted many of the 
statutes of the Association. It aimed to pursue Ôpurely scientific-laboratory work on 
developing the correct methods for the study of the socio-economic structure of the 
countries of the East (imperialism)Õ (cited in Tamazishvili 2008, p. 63). VNAV 
recognized the variety of Ôpolitical, economic and social relationsÕ across Asia, but 
given that imperialism is not confined to Asia, it must study Ôthe entire world on 
whose exploitation the power of the capitalist society in Europe and the United States 
restsÕ (Pavlovich 1922, p. 9). The whole of Africa and much of Latin America was 
included in this field. ÔThe EastÕ thus ceased to have a cultural-geographic unity and 
became primarily a category of economic geography. Such a definition of the ÔEastÕ 
remained unstable, however, since, as Bartolʹd had shown, Ôthe Russian historian of 
the Òancient EastÓ understands this term to mean the space from the Caucasus and 
Central Asia to the Indian Ocean and the countries of the African Lakes, from the 
borders between Iran and India to Gibraltar; the ancient history of this entire space 
Òrepresents a fully finalized wholeÓÕ (2012 [1918], pp.  4-5). The ÔoldÕ and ÔnewÕ 
orientology thus appeared to have different objects in mind, and given that the young, 
ÔnewÕ orientologists were largely reliant on the ÔoldÕ orientology for much of their 
information, if not their interpretive apparatus, the substratum exerted a powerful, 
finally irresistible influence. 
 
One of the earliest attempts to define a new approach was the monograph Problemy 
Vostoka (Problems of the East) published by director of the Eastern section of the 
Comintern, Georgii Safarov (1891-1942), in 1922.
1
 In 1921 Safarov had organized 
the removal of Russian, mainly Cossack, colonists who had been granted land that 
straddles the borders of present-day Kazakhstan and Kirgizia from 1907 to 1917, at 
the expense of the mainly nomadic indigenous population. This represented one of the 
attempts to redress the legacy of Russian imperialism, which Lenin insisted upon and 
which Stalin opposed (Genis 1998).
2
 For Lenin, as for most of the Bolshevik 
leadership, formal equality between nations was insufficient to demonstrate a 
commitment to national liberation, and as members of the former dominant 
nationality, Russians must place themselves in a less advantageous position to those 
of the former colonies in order to establish trust. Concessions to formerly oppressed 
nationalities were thus fundamental to the hegemony of the proletariat. SafarovÕs 
1922 book was a generalisation of questions raised in his 1921 book KolonialÕnaia 
revoliutsiia (Opyt Turkestana) (The Colonial Revolution [The Turkestan 
Experience]), which was based in his experiences trying to consolidate Soviet power 
in central Asia. For Safarov, the Ôquestion of the EastÕ, was the most significant 
dimension of the national question, and not an abstract question of equality or 
discursive forms. It was defined directly by the realities of imperialism and the state 
of the class struggle. The Ôaristocratic-bureaucratic and commercial diplomacyÕ of the 
nineteenth century posed the ÔEastern questionÕ as one of Ôthe military seizure and 
political subjugation of the backward countriesÕ, while the twentieth century had 
begun with an attempt to re-divide colonial possessions among imperial powers 
through combat. Imperial politics now posed the ÔEastern questionÕ as the Ôways and 
means through which the backward countries of the East would be incorporated into 
the global capitalist economic systemÕ, and it Ôelevated this question to the status of a 
matter of principleÕ. Without a proletarian revolution the development of world 
capitalism would lead to more war and devastation, and it was the task of the 
international proletariat to help the labouring masses of the East shorten their path 
from pre-capitalist means of production to communism and so avoid the suffering 
inflicted by capitalist development (Safarov 1922, pp.  25-26). 
 
Safarov nevertheless accepted BartolʹdÕs definition of the ÔEastÕ and stressed the 
importance of understanding the climatic, geographical and demographic 
particularities of the region. While Western feudalism arose on the basis of the 
peasant agrarian subsistence economy, Ôeastern feudalismÕ arose on the basis of both 
nomadic cattle-herding and settled agriculture, between which there was a protracted 
struggle. This led eastern feudalism to persist for an extended period of time and 
when these societies clashed with rising capitalism, they were bound to fall to 
colonial conquest, which compounded their backwardness. Cultural factors such as 
the rise of Islam needed to be understood as corresponding to the particularities of 
Eastern feudalism just as Catholicism corresponded to those of feudalism in Western 
Europe (Safarov 1922, p. 32). The international proletarian revolution had become a 
decisive factor in world politics just as the Ôworking masses themselvesÕ were 
Ôbeginning to cast off the chains of colonial slavery, the rotting remnants of the 
feudal-patriarchal heritageÕ and were laying Ôa solid foundation for their alliance with 
the proletariat of the advanced countriesÕ.  
 
For the early Soviet regime, emerging from war and economic devastation, the Ônodal 
pointÕ of the Eastern question now became Ôthe search for ways and means for the 
gradual transformation of backward economic, political and cultural forms in the 
direction of communismÕ:  
 
In order to lead them forward, we need to know their history; not only 
abstractly, but concretely and to understand their interests. Here communist 
policy confronts Marxist theory with a specific task: to understand the 
historical development of the oppressed peoples of the colonial East, and on 
the basis of the acquired knowledge to indicate the path of revolutionary 
development (Safarov 1922, p. 32). 
 
The ÔEastern questionÕ was thus something posed by world capitalism, to which 
Marxists had to respond. Instead of how to integrate ÔbackwardÕ societies into world 
capitalism and subordinate them to the interests of imperial powers, the question must 
become how to understand and advance the interests of the laboring masses of the 
colonies themselves and in so doing to win leadership in the common struggle. 
Fundamentally there was, at this time, no difference in approach to the Soviet and 
colonial East, even if there were practical and tactical differences. The task was to 
win hegemony over the oppressed, just as the proletariat had won hegemony over 
Russian and non-Russian peasants in the liberation movement against the Russian 
autocracy. The goal was to achieve something approximating a smychka (alliance or 
union) between the proletariat of industrialised countries and the labouring masses of 
the colonial world against the common enemy: international capitalism.  
 
The major works of the new Oriental studies such as Gurko-KriazhinÕs work on 
Turkey, Sultan-ZadeÕs work on Persia or SafarovÕs work on Turkestan and (later) on 
China tended towards being curious hybrids of scholarship and publitsistika (political 
journalism). The Ôpopular-scientificÕ (nauchno-populiarnyi) genre was a characteristic 
result, and was especially prevalent in the publications of Party institutions, reflecting 
the two objectives common to Marxist theory of the period. Reflecting on his time in 
Moscow working with the Comintern in 1922-3, Antonio Gramsci noted that Marxists 
sought a) to Ôcombat modern ideologies in their most refined form, in order to be able 
to constitute its own group of independent intellectualsÕ and b) Ôto educate the popular 
massesÕ, whose culture was marked by Ôresidues of the pre-capitalist world that still 
exist among the popular masses, especially in the field of religion.Õ The Ôsecond task, 
which was fundamental, given the character of the new philosophyÉ absorbed all its 
strengthÕ and led Marxists to form intellectual alliances with Ôextraneous tendenciesÕ 
(Gramsci 1971, p. 392). Marxism thus Ôcombined into a form of culture which was a 
little higher than the popular average (which was very low) but was absolutely 
inadequate to combat the ideologies of the educated classesÕ (Gramsci 1971, p. 392-
93). VNAV was a particularly clear example of this dual orientation and herein lay its 
instability, especially as the political situation shifted decisively at the end of the 
1920s. 
 
While Marxists relied on the ÔoldÕ historico-philological studies located in non-Party, 
state institutions, younger scholars in particular assimilated aspects of Marxism that 
gave their work a new character. Nikolai KonradÕs studies of Japanese history, 
language and literature was one clear example of a certain Marxist perestroika that 
took place among what Gramsci called Ôtraditional intellectualsÕ, while a new 
generation of linguists involved in the codification and standardization of the 
languages of the peoples of the East made crucial contributions not only to the study 
of individual languages, but also in the development of sociological linguistics. 
Marxist linguists like Evgenyi Polivanov and Nikolai Iakovlev and fellow-traveller 
linguists like Rozalia Shor, who strove to break out of the Eurocentric straightjacket 
of contemporary Indo-European philology, while seeking to retain its valid empirical 
data, should be numbered among the most important linguists of the century. More 
broadly, the funding made available for the study and development of the cultures of 
the peoples of the East led to the development of new institutions across the USSR, 
facilitating new, sociological and historical approaches to cultures that had long been 
marginalized in scholarship. A new generation of researchers from the Caucasus and 
Central Asia flourished in these conditions.  
 
Throughout the 1920s, therefore, one sees a complex interaction between Marxist and 
non-Marxist approaches to the study of the Orient, with influence flowing in both 
directions. Extracting specific works or debates from this wider field of engagement 
inevitably does them violence. To study this complex field adequately requires an 
approach that draws more from Mikhail BakhtinÕs ideas about modes of dialogue, 
GramsciÕs work on ÔtraditionalÕ and ÔorganicÕ intellectuals in the apparatus of 
hegemony, and Pierre BourdieuÕs ideas about the shifting power of scientific and 
statutory authority in the Ôscientific fieldÕ than FoucaultÕs Ôclosed circleÕ of 
power/knowledge. 
 
Closing the circle 
 
While debates about approaches to the study of the East abounded in the 1920s, there 
were attempts to close the circle. Belligerent advocates of Ôproletarian cultureÕ had 
opportunistically lodged themselves in parts of the burgeoning cultural bureaucracy at 
the beginning of the New Economic Policy and sought to evaluate perspectives 
according to the genealogy of their ideas and the sociological origin of this or that 
thinker.
 3
 Sophisticated engagement with other perspectives was here replaced by an 
attempt simply to ÔunmaskÕ the social and political orientation camouflaged by 
intellectual language, and to judge a work purely according to this criterion. Much has 
been written about the struggle by specific groups to achieve Party support under the 
slogan of Ôproletarian hegemonyÕ in the sphere of artistic literature, and how the 
Stalin regime gave them free reign to shift the balance of power in the cultural sphere. 
Some such figures participated in institutions such as the Communist University of 
the Toilers of the East (KUTV), a Party institution designed simultaneously to train 
indigenous cadre from the national regions and Communists in the anti-colonial 
movement abroad. This influence was strengthened by the influx of careerists into the 
Party in the so-called ÔLenin LevyÕ of 1924, though they remained of marginal 
importance until the end of the 1920s when Stalin effectively eliminated the 
distinction between Party and State institutions, subordinating the latter to the former.  
 
Another impulse toward closure came from within the realm of state institutions and 
derived from the pre-revolutionary orientology. By the mid 1920s Nikolai Marr had 
established a firm institutional base in Leningrad, controlling institutions in which 
important work in oriental studies took place.
4
 The institutes also had branches in the 
Caucasus, and Marr sat on a number of influential committees within the state 
educational and research apparatus, where he sought to advance his own perspectives. 
Marr had made his reputation in archaeology and Caucasian philology before the 
Revolution, but is best known for his controversial work in linguistics, which 
achieved official recognition as ÔMarxism in LinguisticsÕ from 1932 until 1950, 
despite the fact that his work had little in common with Marxism. Generally speaking, 
Marr developed an ideology critique of Indo-European philology in which he 
demonstrated the way in which colonial assumptions among linguists led to a 
marginalization of languages and cultures without a sustained written culture, 
assumed the identity of a single language and a single people and assumed the special 
place of Aryan peoples in world history. There were clearly important insights here, 
and they have recently found support in scholarship inspired by SaidÕs contention that 
was Ôthe extraordinarily rich and celebrated cultural positionÕ of philology that 
Ôendowed orientalism with its most important technical characteristicsÕ (1995 [1978], 
p. 131).
5
 Contemporary scholars were inspired by certain of MarrÕs ideas about 
functional and palaeontological semantics to develop valuable studies of literature and 
folklore, which broke decisively with Indo-European methods of tracing the ancestry 
of narratives. Other aspects of MarrÕs linguistic work remain either highly contentious 
(such as the kinship of Basque, Etruscan, Caucasian and Semitic languages) or 
discredited (the most obvious being the derivation of all languages from four 
primordial phonemes sal, ber, ion and rosh).  
 
What is most significant here, however, is that Marr sought to discredit Indo-
European philology as a whole on the grounds that it is Ôflesh and bone the expression 
of moribund bourgeois socialityÕ that had been Ôbuilt on the oppression of the peoples 
of the East by the murderous colonial policies of European nationsÕ (Marr 1934a 
[1924], p. 1). MarrÕs critique had much in common with that of Foucault decades 
later. Both collapsed the distinction between factual accuracy and methodological 
rigor on the one hand and interpretation, generalization or conceptualization on the 
other. Thus, the formal methods that the comparativists, developed solely to establish 
genetic relationships between languages, were themselves rejected because linguists 
assumed the idea of the proto-language and limited their attention to Indo-European 
languages and those with a written Ôculture.Õ For Marr, as for Nietzsche before him, 
and for Foucault after him, evidence is simply a ploy to establish a ÔtruthÕ that is to 
oneÕs advantage. It was undoubtedly important to identify the ideological and 
institutional factors behind biases in selection and in generalization Ðfor instance, that 
linguists had generated a large amount of factual data on Sanskrit but much less on 
Dravidian or Kartvelian languages (Marr 1934a [1924], p. 1). Yet instead of 
highlighting the qualitative importance of the limited data available in the latter cases, 
or providing new data based on those languages by means of the comparative 
methods, and arguing that this required a paradigm shift, Marr sought to find other 
methods to establish the genetic relationships that he wanted to prove.  
 
The majority of Soviet linguists shared MarrÕs dissatisfaction with the formal method 
in linguistics as excessively abstract and narrow, cutting language off from its wider 
social conditions and so gravitating towards a concern with dead over living 
languages. MarrÕs most talented critic, Polivanov, also criticized linguists for their 
mechanical application of categories designed to describe European languages to very 
different non-European languages such as Vietnamese.
6
 New perspectives based on 
different methodologies needed to be developed. Polivanov could not, however, 
support MarrÕs rejection of Indo-Europeanism in its entirety. By ruling out the 
comparative method tout court rather than seeking to criticize its shortcomings or 
improve it, Marr had to develop his own ad hoc comparative methods to answer the 
same genetic questions that Indo-European linguists had raised. Immanent factors of 
development were now replaced by environmental ones, through which language, as 
an organism Ôbegins as a multitude of Òmollusc-like embryo languagesÓ andÉ 
develops by Òcrossing,Ó ÔÓhybridizationÓ and Òmutation,Ó in a constantly upward 
direction until a perfect, single language will be achievedÕ (Thomas 1957, p. 143). 
This Ôsingle glottogonic processÕ through which languages develop from polygenetic 
origins, converge and finally merge cleared away all linguistic barriers to the full 
participation of colonial peoples in the process of social evolution. Hybridity did not 
now stop with the creation of a pan-Russian identity, but became what is today called 
the project of globalization. MarrÕs narrative of convergence, merger and mixture 
bears striking resemblance to the postcolonial theoristsÕ valorization of migration, 
decentering and ÔhybridityÕ as a positive value in and of itself. The same processes 
may, however, serve and be promoted by the metropolitan centre as much as the 
colonized periphery.  
 
For Marr a Ôpost-colonialÕ age had dawned. The ÔdistinctionÕ (granʹ) between East 
and West as an economic and cultural reality, as well as an intellectual construct, was 
seen to be Ômelting awayÕ, to be replaced by a Ôdistinction between social layersÕ 
(Marr 1926, p. iv). The legitimacy of such a perspective within the USSR itself 
depended on the overcoming of real economic and political disparities between 
Russia and its former colonies, but this did not concern Marr. In the 1920s the 
structures of the USSR facilitated a significant inflow of capital from the centre to the 
regions, establishing an anti-imperial relationship, but once the central bureaucracy 
decisively seized control of the economy through forced collectivization and other 
coercive measures, and marshaled all resources in the cause of military competition 
with hostile imperial powers, this changed fundamentally. By the criteria of the 
Marxist definition of imperialism (Lenin 1964 [1916]; Bukharin 1929 [1917]), which 
fundamentally involved the extraction of capital, the Soviet state became an imperial 
power. While directly colonial relations did not return as a general trend imperial 
relations were very clearly established, while Marrist ÔdiscourseÕ deflected attention 
away from these realities.
7
 
 
The political nullification that accompanied the radical rhetoric of Marrism was the 
focus of the second challenge to its claim to official status as ÔMarxism in linguisticsÕ, 
which came from the group of young linguists called Iazykfront (Language-front). 
While crediting Marr with revealing the political agenda underlying Indo-
Europeanism and with ÔcorrectlyÕ positing language as part of the superstructure,
8
 the 
group complained that the exclusive focus on the longue dure of linguistic and 
cultural development (semantic palaeontology), along with the mechanical nature of 
MarrÕs formulations rendered the theory politically inadequate. Instead they proposed 
a focus on Ôthe study of the language of the collective farmer, of the worker, the 
problems of planned influence on linguistic processes and the verification of theory 
by practice.Õ
9
 They also proposed a whole range of ways in which linguists might 
intervene in the education of school children (Lomtev 1931, p. 161). While these 
tasks were directly linked to the Stalinist agenda, Marrism had indeed proven itself 
peripheral in the anti-colonial policies of the early Revolutionary period such as the 
codification of the languages of the national minorities, the development of their print 
culture and educational processes.
10
 Moreover, Marrism remained largely irrelevant to 
studies of the social bases and institutional functions of language, the development of 
a new, democratized, public discourse, the development of a revolutionary press to 
link together the cities and the countryside, and techniques in overcoming the 
pervasive illiteracy that had been bequeathed by the Tsarist state. Indeed, it was 
participation by linguists, orientalists and philologists more generally in these very 
tasks that led to path-breaking developments in linguistic and cultural theory in the 
early USSR. MarrismÕs focus on convergence made it compatible with the 
centralizing policies of the Stalin regime, while linguists with a greater appreciation 
of socioeconomic and political dimensions of power fell out of favour.
 11
 A new 
generation of dilettantes was now able to supplant established scholars by echoing 
Marrist formulations and presenting a distinctly caricatured account of the history of 
linguistic thought. Rather like ÔorientalismÕ today, ÔIndo-EuropeanismÕ and 
ÔcomparativismÕ became terms of scholarly abuse.  
 
None of this would have been decisive had StalinÕs Ôrevolution from aboveÕ at the end 
of the decade not brought together the Marrists and advocates of proletarian culture as 
a single institutional force hostile to the critical processes at work within both 
philology and oriental studies. The misleading proletarian rhetoric was employed to 
justify fundamental changes in policy that transformed the nature of the state and the 
tasks set for the Communist Parties in the colonial world. They now needed to orient 
fully on establishing governments supportive of the USSR in any conflagration rather 
than prioritizing social transformation. The exploratory works produced by VNAV 
did not serve this imperative any more than the new critical approaches emerging 
from the various research institutes working on languages and cultures. Thus leading 
members of the Association came under attack in the pages of a number of prominent 
journals and, dangerously, were even accused of concealed Trotskyism (Mamet 1930; 
Tamazishvili 2008, pp. 102-03, 112-23). In 1930 VNAV lost its autonomy as it was 
incorporated into the Communist Academy. To confirm the ubiquity of the shift, 
Safarov, seeking rehabilitation after the defeat of the Leningrad opposition in 1927, 
published a directly Stalinist assessment of the Ôposition on the oriental studies frontÕ 
in 1931 (Safarov 1931). The harassment of orientologists coincided with the 
appearance of notorious hatchet-men such as Valerian Aptekarʹ and Sergei Bykovskii 
establishing the institutional dominance of Marrism in linguistics. 
 
Many representatives of both the ÔoldÕ and ÔnewÕ oriental studies, along with many of 
the old revolutionaries, were eliminated in the Stalinist purges of the late 1930s. After 
this, as Alpatov notes Ôthere was a conscious restoration of the tradition of Russian 
pre-revolutionary science (and not only science)Õ, symptomatic of which was StalinÕs 
1950 intervention in linguistics, which denounced MarrÕs Ôquasi-MarxismÕ and called 
for a return to Ôthe tradition of Russian science of the end of the 19
th
 and beginning of 
the 20
th
 centuries, positivist in spiritÕ (Alpatov 1997, p. 17). As in the pre-
Revolutionary period, what was required was a type of oriental studies that rejected 
the orientalist dichotomies of the Western powers and promoted the Ôpeaceful 
convergenceÕ of the peoples of the East with Russia.  
 
From ÔSoviet OrientalismÕ to postcolonialism 
 
During the Cold War a rhetorical dichotomy of ÔSovietÕ and ÔBourgeois OrientalismÕ 
crystallized, as newly independent states turned to the USSR to lessen their 
dependence on trade with their old colonial masters and the USSR sought to establish 
a network of allied states to offset the power of the United States. At the very moment 
that the Cold War began, the journal Voprosy istorii published the programmatic text 
ÔUrgent Tasks of Soviet Orientalist-HistoriansÕ, which presented Ôbourgeois oriental 
studiesÕ as Ôserving imperialism in an extraordinarily vigorous mannerÕ, striving ÔÒto 
proveÓ the historical inevitability and even the ÒnecessityÓ of the rule of the western 
colonial powers over the multi-million masses, who are lagging behind in their 
progress and, therefore, ÒincapableÓ of independently deciding the fate of the East 
themselvesÕ (Anon 1949, p. 5). Such scholars produce Ôfalse, pseudo-historical 
ÒtheoriesÓ and Òconceptions,ÓÕ which may Ôdiffer in details and on particular points 
but they bear a testimony to a complete unity on the principal and fundamental 
questionÕ (1949, p. 5). This involves the propagation of a particular type of exoticism 
about Ôthe special type of ÒEastern soulÓÕ, relishing Ôunimportant details of the 
religious cults or repeat entertaining palace-anecdotes about dynastic historiesÕ (1949, 
p. 6).  
 
The same sentiments appear in countless programmatic statements of the 1950s and 
1960s, boosted by the victory of the Communist Party in the Chinese Civil War in 
1950 and by the April 1955 Bandung Conference which eventually led, in 1961, to 
the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement. As the USSR attempted to utilise 
decolonisation for its own ends, the characterisation of Ôbourgeois orientalismÕ was 
taught to generations of intellectuals from the decolonizing parts of the word at 
institutes like as the Patrice Lumumba Peoples Friendship University in Moscow, 
founded in 1960, the same year that the USSR hosted the 25
th
 International Congress 
of Orientalists. At the opening of the congress senior Politburo member Anastas 
Mikoian (1960, pp. 3-6) declared that henceforth the peoples of the East will be 
transformed from the objects to the creators of their own history, culture and 
economy. Meanwhile, the loosening of the intellectual environment after StalinÕs 
death led to a greater pluralism in Soviet oriental studies, perhaps best exemplified in 
the later work of Konrad (1967) that was even published in English translation. 
 
As Vera Tolz (2006, p. 127) has shown, this exerted a formative influence on SaidÕs 
Orientalism via the work of the Egyptian Marxist Anouar Abdel-Malek (1963), the 
main difference being SaidÕs alienation from pro-Soviet Communist Parties because 
of their attempts to subordinate liberation movements to Soviet interests and to 
impose MoscowÕs schema on all theories of domestic social and economic 
development. Said integrated these perspectives, along with selected ideas from 
Foucault, Gramsci and many others into what Brennan calls the Ôpatented eclectic 
amalgamÕ (2006, p. 111) that became Orientalism. While SaidÕs relationship to 
Marxism was complex and became more nuanced over time, some among the post-
1968 generation of postcolonial theorists decisively rejected it and turned instead to 
Nietzsche and Heidegger, perhaps the most anti-democratic and Eurocentric of 
modern European philosophers, to rationalize their withdrawal from collective 
politics. They now closed the circle of a unitary orientalist discourse, and employed 
Foucault Ôto justify political quietism with sophisticated intellectualism, at the same 
time wishing to appear realistic, in touch with the world of power and realityÕ (Said 
1983, p. 245). What was forgotten was that the postcolonial critique remained rooted 
in the very principles they sought to expose. 
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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1
 Safarov, like a number of oppositionists, has been subject to very little direct study, 
even though their influence in these and other key debates was substantial. The 
absence of an intellectual and political biography of the head of the Comintern 
Grigorii Zinoviev is a particularly clear example of these lacunae in scholarship. 
2
 Safarov was rebuked for the ÔextremeÕ position he adopted on the question in 
Bukhara and was removed from his post in Turkestan in October 1921 in order that 
the central government could establish a compromise between the different sectors of 
the population (Smith 1999: 99-101). 
3
 One such figure was the prominent member of the belligerent literary group 
ÔOnguardÕ (Na postu!), IlÕia Vardin, who engaged in attacks on Ôfellow-travellerÕ 
orientologists under the pseudonym of I. Visanov (Tamazishvili 2008: 92-94) 
4
 These included the State Academy for the History of Material Culture (GAIMK) and 
the Institute of Language and Thinking (IIaM). 
5
 Among such work see, for instance, Olender (1992 [1989]) and Benes (2008). 
6
 For an overview, see Leontʹev 1983, pp. 31Ð45. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7
 After MarrÕs death in 1934, however, the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States, and 
the deportation of nationalities at the end of World War 2 provided conspicuous 
counter-examples. 
8 
 This was a controversial formulation that Marr adopted from a textbook of Marxism 
by Nikolai Bukharin and had no basis in MarxÕs own writings.  
9
 ÔIz stenogrammy torzhestvennogo sobraniia v NIIaZe, posviashchennogo 
godovshchine ego sushchestvovaniia, 2 marta, 1932g: Vystuplenie direktora instituta 
M.N. BochacheraÕ [From the stenograph of the gala meeting in The Institute of 
Linguistics dedicated to the anniversary of its existence 2 March 1932: The directorÕs 
presentation by M.N. Bochacher], GARF A-2307/17/84. 
10 
For instance, MarrÕs convoluted Ôanalytic alphabetÕ, which aimed to accommodate 
the phonetic variations of all languages, proved largely unsuitable for the grandiose 
tasks he set for it. 
11 
Marr was not alone among the older generation of Orientologists to present his 
ideas with a Marxist gloss at this time. See, for instance the late articles of Olʹdenburg 
(1931) in which a dichotomy of Soviet and Western Oriental Studies is already posed 
quite clearly. 
